The Problem of Evil is one of the subjects that Islamic philosophers have profoundly explored. Their objective has been to provide a rational and reasoned explanation for the evils and sufferings present in the world, and to comprehensively elucidate their truth and nature. On one hand, one of the most significant theories in Transcendent Philosophy (al-hikmat al-muta'āliyah) is that evils have a privative (ʿadami) nature, lacking any independent existence and being inherently ineffective. This theory, by distinguishing the various identifiable aspects within evils, strives to refer the aspect of being evil to a privative matter (amr ʿadamī), while everything that has an existential aspect is explained as good (khayr) and desirable. On the other hand, since God, as the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd), is perfect in every respect-including His attributes and acts-this necessitates that the universe, in all its levels-even at the physica-l and material level-must also be the most perfect and best possible system (niẓām). Accordingly, evils have no place in the 'Best System' (niẓām al-aḥsan). Therefore, the analysis of the Problem of Evil by philosophers such as Hume and Mackie appears unreasonable; because they failed to distinguish the different aspects and dimensions from one another and confined the various dimensions of the phenomenon that manifests evil solely to its characteristic of being evil. Whereas one of the pillars of philosophical analysis is to differentiate and not to conflate various aspects (ḥaythiyyāt). In this research, utilizing a descriptive-analytical method, Mullā Ṣadrā's response to the doubts raised by Hume and J.L. Mackie regarding the Problem of Evil is explained.